Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Egypt by Brent Hansen & Karim Nashashibi
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Egypt





Chapter Title: Chapter 9: Efforts to Broaden the Industrial Structure: The New Industries
Chapter Author: Brent Hansen, Karim Nashashibi
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c4058





In Chapter 6 we mentioned the change from basin to perennial irrigation that
took place in the second half of the nineteenth century and the increased need
for fertilizer inputs that accompanied it, further intensified in the 1960s by the
Aswan High Dam. As early as 1911, Egypt imported 60,000 tons of fertilizers,
and by 1960 her consumption of fertilizer per acre of cultivated land surpassed
all developing countries except Taiwan and South Korea.1 Thus, there is a
very substantial domestic market for chemical fertilizers in Egypt. The de-
mand is concentrated on phosphate and nitrogen fertilizers; potash is of sec-
ondary importance.
Since phosphate and nitrogen fertilizers are produced by two distinct
industries in Egypt, they will be discussed separately.
The Phosphiite Fertilizer Industry.
The phosphate fertilizer industry had a relatively early start in Egypt—
the combined result of strong domestic demand and abundant domestic de-
posits of phosphate rock. The demand for phosphate fertilizers arose from the
cultivation of beans and clover, in particular. Large deposits of relatively low-
grade phosphate rock were discovered in the Red Sea area and near Esna, and
earlier some of the rock seems to have been used directly in areas with suffi-
cient soil acidity. In the beginning, most of the phosphate rock was exported
to Japan. By 1936 total exports of phosphate rock had reached half a million
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tons. But it is obvious that Egypt had natural advantages in producing super-
phosphates herself.
The first superphosphate factory was in 1937 at Kafr-El-Zayat
in the Nile Delta, with a small annual capacity of 25,000 tons. It was followed
by a second plant, with a capacity of 35,000 tons, at Abu Zaabal in 1948. Both
got their phosphate rock by rail from the Esna deposits some 500 miles away.
The location of the factories, combined with the seasonal nature of the de-
mand, resulted in severe transportation problems. As capacity and scale of
production were expanded, the single-track, narrow-gauge rail line responsible
for part of the transportation became overburdened. Eventually this led to
disruption of production in the years 1961—1964 (see Chart 9—1). Recently,
a new plant with a 200,000-ton capacity was built at Assiout, much closer to
the phosphate rock deposits.2
The sulphuric acid needed as a catalyst was originally derived from roast-
ing pyrites imported from Cyprus. This technology is capital-intensive and was
CHART 9-1
Phosphate Fertilizers: Production and Trade, 1947—1971
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probably less economical thanone based on elemental sulphur, but may
have been justified at the time because of favorable special arrangements made
with the suppliers regarding prices and quantities to be delivered. The Korean
boom and the growth in Egypt's pyrite requirements led to the abrogation of
these arrangements, and the import price of pyrites rose from $8 per ton in
1950 to $15.50 per ton in 1953 and remained at that level thereafter.
In the early 1950s Egyptian superphosphates emerged as a powerful im-
port substitute, although the rate of protection against imported fertilizers did
not exceed 10 to 15 percent of the c.i.f. price. By 1954, domestic production
was sufficient to satisfy domestic demand, and a ban on imports was imposed.
In 1960, however, when .production fell short of demand, imports reappeared,
partly because of the transportation problems mentioned above. They fell again
drastically after 1964 and Egypt emerged as an exporter of superphosphates.
From 1965 to 1968 exports amounted to about 30,000 tons annually, going
mainly to Arab countries. In 1970 a level of 93,000 tons was reached.
COST AND REVENUE DATA
Cost data on superphosphates, derived from the operations of the same
two factories, are available for 1954, 1957, and While the com-
parability of the results is enhanced by the homogeneity of the output, a change
in technology between 1957 and 1964—65 that substituted elemental sulphur
for pyrites in the production of sulphuric acid4 posed some problems in inter-
preting cost trends.5
In the calculations for 1954, an adjustment to 90 percent capacity utili-
zation (the level of utilization actually prevailing in the other years studied
here) was made. Domestic resource costs were calculated on the basis of
import prices c.i.f. (see Table 9—1). For 1964—65, however, we have com-
puted resource costs also on the basis of two alternative f.o.b. export prices:
the export unit value actually realized in 1964—65 and the average export unit
value realized in 1969 and 1970. Comparison makes it possible for us to
assess the profitability of the industry, both as an import-substituting and as
an exporting activity.
THE COMPETITIVENESS OF EGYPTIAN SUPERPHOSPHATES
The industry initially looked like an inefficient attempt at import substi-
tution: it was designed to operate at a low and uneconomical scale; it relied on
low-grade phosphate deposits with unreliable and expensive transportation to
the plant; and it resorted to the derivation of sulphuric acid via pyrites, nor-
mally a relatively expensive method, based on a short-lived favorable price
arrangement. On the other hand, the industry benefited from cheap labor and
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large freight margin—iS to 20 percent of the import price of the final product
and 40 to 50 percent of the import price of phosphate rock.
By 1954, the industry had seventeen years of experience, including a diffi-
cult period during World War II. With a domestic price 14 percent above the
average import price c.i.f., the industry's rate of return on capital was 17.6
percent at a capacity utilization of 53percent.Evaluated at import prices, the
industry was competitive at a rate of return on capital of 8.9 percent, even at
this low utilization of capacity. At a 10 percent rate of return, the resource
costs were only slightly higher than the official exchange rate. Had the industry
operated at full capacity, it would have been competitive in exports as well.
Conditions were thus sufficiently favorable to offset the initial drawbacks and
to make the industry profitable and competitive.
In 1964—65, the industry was efficient both as an import substitute and
in exports. Its domestic resource cost, based on that year's export price and a
10 percent rate of return on capital, was 36.4 piasters, well below the official
exchange rate of 43.5 piasters per U.S. dollar. At the much lower export price
realized in the 1969—70 period, the resource cost per U.S. dollar earned in
1964—65 would have been 49.5 piasters, somewhat higher than the official
exchange rate but substantially lower than the exchange rate of 61 piasters per
U.S. dollar suggested by the IMFtothe Egyptian government in 1966. The
latter exchange rate would make the industry as profitable in exports (and a
fortiori as an import substitute) in 1969—70 despite the international price
decline.
In discussing the development of the industry's efficiency and profitability,
our first focus is on the price developments in its output and input.
Over the last two decades, domestic prices for superphosphates, both at
factory gate and delivered to the farmer, have remained relatively stable. Most
of the time the ex-factory price has stood at about £El0.0 per ton, with the
farmer paying about £E11.5 per ton.6 During this twenty-year period,
the import unit values, albeit less stable, have fluctuated around an average of
£E10.0 per ton.7 On the other hand, export unit values have been falling since
1964, possibly as a result of attempts to reach new markets and expand exports.
In..contrast to the relative stability of the output prices, raw materials
prices rose, particularly those of rock phosphate and packing material. Over
the 1954-195 7 period, however, this rise in cost was offset by a higher capacity
utilization, which prevented the rate of return from falling.Profitability,
measured at actual prices, was only slightly lower in 1957 than in 1954. In
terms of international prices, it shows a similar development, falling from 8.9
percent in 1954 to 7.4 percent in 1957. The calculations at constant interna-
tional prices and full capacity indicate that productive efficiency was higher in
1954 than in 1957. This decline in efficiency is also reflected in higher physical
input coefficients.EFFORTS TO BROADEN THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE 261
Input prices continued to increase between 1957 and 1964—65. At the
same time, wage increases exceeded the rate of productivity growth, the typical
pattern for manufacturing industry (Chapter 4). However, while in the cement
industry labor productivity fell, in the phosphate industry it increased sub-
stantially. An improvement in the quality of labor may have contributed to this
development, but it is also a result of the "embodied" technical progress related
to the expansion of capacity described above. Productivity of capital increased,
although the value of the machinery and equipment installed doubled between
1957 and 1964—65. Evaluated at constant prices, domestic resource costs de-
clined from 32.5 piasters to 29.7 piasters. On balance, the growth in labor
productivity and a rise in the import price of phosphates more than offset the
rise in wages and material input prices, resulting in an improvement in the
competitive position of superphosphates in 1964—65 over 1957. Moreover,
there is no firm evidence that production was physically less efficient in
1964—65 than a decade earlier. A hypothetical computation of resource costs
at a 90 percent capacity utilization in 1954 yields a DRC of 26.1 against 29.7
in 1964—65 at a 10 percent rate of return and constant prices.
Once labor's share in value added has returned to the level prevailing
before 1961, as it appears to have done by all indications in the early 1970s,
the industry should be more efficient than it was in 1955 and should be highly
profitable as an export activity. A comparison of its 1964—65 cost shares (rela-
tive to the international output price) to that of a Yugoslavian plant shows
that Egypt derives some advantage from its labor costs, although these repre-
sent only a small share of the total. More important is the marked advantage
it reaps from low raw materials costs.8 The recent discovery of new deposits of
phosphates should further strengthen the competitiveness of the industry.
The Nitrogen Fertilizer Industry.
Nitrogen fertilizer production began in 1951. The product was calcium
nitrate (15.5 nitrogen) based on gases emerging as a by-product of the two
petroleum refineries in Suez. Until 1961 calcium nitrate was the only nitro-
genous fertilizer produced in Egypt. It was well suited to the high acidity of
Egyptian soils but had a low nitrogen content and required large amounts of
inert matter; transportation costs were therefore high and it was highly subject
to leaching.
Imports of calcium ammonium nitrates increased rapidly during the fifties,
and in 1954 it was decided to produce ammonium nitrates domestically. This
type of nitrogen fertilizer is particularly appropriate for Egyptian soil: it allows
for a much higher nitrogen concentration and is resistant to leaching. Moreover,
the domestic demand for this type of fertilizer was sufficient to justify produc-
tion on a scale large enough to attain productive efficiency. The location of the262 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
plant, however, posed certain problems. The Suez refineries supplied all their
gases to the existing calcium nitrate plant and could not accommodate a
greater capacity. Appreciable reserves of natural gas had not yet been dis-
covered, and oil production satisfied only two-thirds of domestic demand. It
was therefore decided to carry out an old plan elaborated after the second
raising of the old Aswan Dam in 1934 for electrifying the dam and using an
electrolytic process to obtain the required hydrogen.9 The weaknesses of the
original plan at the time were the relatively low economies of scale associated
with the technology, the lack of demand for the oxygen by-product, and the
high costs of transporting the fertilizer to the Delta, which consumes a large
share of the output. The production cost of the fertilizers depended critically,
of course, on the pricing of electricity. On the face of it, the price paid by the
fertilizer plant for electricity seemed quite low (at 1.178 milliemes per kwh)—
only one-sixth of the next lowest price paid by an industrial undertaking
(cement). However, information on the costs of niectrifying the dam indicate
that the pricing of electricity to the fertilizer plant did assure a normal return
(8 to 10 percent) on the electrification investment and hence did not conceal
a subsidy for the fertilizer industry.10 Given the large difference in the social
costs of producing electricity at Aswan and in lower Egypt, the increasing
demand for fertilizer in upper Egypt, with its conversion to perennial irriga-
tion, and the rise in fuel and gas costs at the end of the 1960s, the decision to
use an electrolytic process seems to have been correct. The Aswan plant,
KIMA, the construction of which was well coordinated with the electrification
of the dam, began production in 1961 and reached an annual output of 600,000
tons of ammonium nitrate fertilizers (20.5 percent N) by 1964.
In addition to the demand for ammonium nitrates, the government an-
ticipated a strong increase in the demand for ammonium suiphates as a conse-
quence of the construction of the Aswan High Dam. The two large consumers
of this fertilizer are rice and sugar cane, which were to be the main beneficiaries
of the increased water supply. The government decided, therefore, to build a
100,000-ton unit adjacent to the Suez plant, based on sulphur and gases from
the expanded Suez refineries. This unit started production in 1963, and Suez
was now developing into a petrochemical complex where all the by-products
of oil refining were being gradually put to use.
The KIMA factory at Aswan suffered from the same kind of transporta-
tion difficulties that faced the phosphate industry on the long haul between
Aswari and the Lower Egypt consuming areas—long shipping delays, accumu-
lation of inventories, and spoilage of the fertilizer through moisture absorp-
tion." It did not, on the other hand, depend upon long shipments of bulky
raw materials. Thus, while the consumers felt the inconvenience of the trans-
portation problems, the production process itself did not suffer from the serious.
interruptions that plagued the phosphate industry; this explains much of theEFFORTS TO BROADEN THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE 263
difference between the growth performance of the two industries during the
1960—1963 period (Charts 9.1 and 9.2).
Moreover, transportation costs per unit of nutrient diminished through the
output's increasing nitrogen content. In 1964 the pcoduction of the 20.5 per-
cent nitrogen variety was abandoned in favor of a 26 percent variety, and in
1968 the latter was discontinued in favor of a 31 percent variety.'2 Apart from
achieving economies in transportation costs, the higher nitrogen concentration
also reduces the costs of other materials, such as limestone.
CHART 9-2
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.EFFORTS TO BROADEN THE INDUSTRLAL STRUCTURE 265
The high rate of investments in the industry together with the large do-
mestic market explain the steepness of the production curve in the 1951—61
period (Chart The potential demand for in Egypt at low
prices and the allocation of investment funds to the expansion ofindustry
could undoubtedly have maintained this rate of growth for a number of years.
The 1967 War, however, resulted in the destruction of both the Suez petroleum
refineries and the adjacent fertilizer plants. By 1970 the production of calcium
nitrates and ammonium sulphates had completely ceased, reducing output of
nitrogenous fertilizer by 30 percent.'3 Nevertheless, in spite of these setbacks,
the industry should resume its growth with the inauguration in 1971 of a
fertilizer plant in the Cairo area. It feeds upon the gases of the coking plant
that serves the requirements of the Helwan steel mill, and its capacity is
planned to reach 800,000 tons per year from the present total of 400,000 tons
by 1975. The government has shown a strong and sustained commitment to
both fertilizer industries to expand capacity well beyond projected consump-
tion in the expectation of exploiting a growing export market.
COSTS AND REVENUES
Cost data are available for 1954, 1957 and 1964—65. However, it should
be clear from our historical introduction that the data are strictly comparable
only for 1954 and 1957; in these two years they pertain to the same product
and production unit. By 1964—65 the industry had expanded into additional
products and production units, and the cost data include all plants. Neverthe-
less, the final output may be considered the same, namely, nitrogen nutrients.
The changes in nutrient concentrations, the introduction of new techniques
with different inputs and by-products may all be considered technological in-
novations that aim at improving the performance of the industry. What matters
is the competitiveness of the output-mix produced in 1964—65 as compared
with the output-mix (in our case a single product) produced in the years 1954
and 1957. It can be determined by estimating the resource cost of the domestic
fertilizer-mix in terms of import prices of equivalent fertilizer varieties.
In Table 9—3 we have estimated effective rates of protection and domestic
resource in both current and constant international prices. As the in-
dustry was operating at various levels of capacity in the three years, we have
also calculated resource costs at 90 percent "full capacity" utilization.
The choice of international prices causes some problems in this industry.
Although Egypt has both exported and imported fertilizers, it was decided to
use c.i.f. import prices. Therefore, c.i.f. prices for fertilizers with equivalent
concentrations had to be found. These were readily available for calcium
nitrates and ammonium sulphates because concentrations here are standard-
ized. However, ammonium nitrates were imported in mixed concentrations




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.268 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
variety. Fortunately, both of the Egyptian varieties were exported, and through
the addition of a freight margin, hypothetical import prices were calculated.
Domestic and foreign prices are set out in
THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE NITROGEN FERTILIZER INDUSTRY,
1954 TO 1964—65
In its first year of production (1951) the fertilizer industry priced its
calcium nitrates at £E31 per ton. The equivalent import price was £E21.0.
The price difference amounted to a nominal rate of protection of 48 percent.
The domestic price was then gradually reduced, with temporary increases in
1957 and 1958, to £E21.3 in 1968. The import price also declined, albeit
more moderately, with the result that the nominal rate of protection was re-
duced to 15 percent in 1965 and perhaps to less in 1968. The degree of pro-
tection of those nitrogen fertilizers that were introduced in the 1960s was sub-
stantially higher. With each weighted by its nitrogen content, the average
degree of protection in 1964—65 amounted to 29 percent. Nevertheless, small
quantities of ammonium nitrates were exported in 1965 and 1966, and the
intention behind the additional investments, allocated to the industry, was to
create a substantial export surplus and to transform the industry into a foreign
exchange earner.
Of course, it is entirely possible for an industry to be both protected in
the sense that the domestic price is higher than the c.i.f. import price and to be
an efficient foreign exchange earner. The necessary conditions are a domestic
monopoly (the condition is fulfilled when production as well as trade are
nationalized) and costs of production falling short of the c.i.f. import price
by a sufficient margin to absorb freight and yielding a marginal revenue on
exports equal to or larger than marginal costs.14 We shall investigate whether
these conditions were fulfilled by the Egyptian nitrogenous fertilizer industry.
Let us first look at the data for 1954 and 1957 as given in Table 9—3.
In terms of domestic prices, the rate of return increased from 9.4 percent in
1954 to 14.6 percent in 1957. The general price increase that occurred after
1956 (see Chapter 3) included fertilizers.15 This price increase helped to
secure Jñgher profitability in terms of domestic prices despite a general increase
in input prices, particularly for fuel oil and refinery gases. In terms of interna-
tional prices, profitability declined, however, from 1.5 to —2.0 percent, be-
cause the c.i.f. price of calcium nitrates fell. As a result, resource. costs (at 10
percent rate of return) increased from 52.4 piasters in 1954 to 61.1 piasters in
1957, in spite of higher capacity utilization. At hypothetical full capacity
utilization, the competitive position of the industry in 1954 and 1957 was
better, of course, but the decline of competitiveness was enhanced. The ERP
increased from 24.7 percent to 48.3 percent. Thus, after several years of op-
eration, in 1957 the nitrogen fertilizer industry was in greater need of protec-EFFORTS TO BROADEN THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE 269
tion than in its earlier years. Prices of fertilizers abroad fell, while the domestic
industry, with the given scale and technique of production, was faced with
rising input prices and costs.
In terms of constant prices, the industry shows a lower resource cost in
1957 than in 1954, but this is attributable to the higher capacity utilization.
At hypothetical full capacity utilization, the resource costs are virtually at the
same level, some 20 percent above the official exchange rate.
Wage developments are not of much direct importance for the industry;
wages do not exceed 10 percent of the total cost of production (at interna-
tional prices). The bulk of production costs consists of payments for three
inputs: fuel, refinery gases, and packing. Any substantial improvement in the
industry's competitiveness depends upon cost reduction for these inputs, or on
major changes in production techniques. Substantial fuel cost reductions were,
indeed, achieved (in terms of international prices) through the falling oil prices
during the 1960s and the shift in Egypt's position from a net importer to a net
exporter of oil, with the resulting change of opportunity cost of oil from a c.i.f.
basis to an f.o.b. basis. The introduction of a new packing material promised
cost savings. At the end of the 1960s the industry introduced the use of plastic
bags—a by-product of the domestic petroleum industry—in lieu of paper or
jute bags. In addition to the advantages of lower costs and a low import con-
tent, plastic bags also protect the fertilizer from moisture. Finally, refinery
gases became relatively cheaper. In the late l940s the gases—mainly butane
and methane—were wasted. Eventually, butane was marketed on a large scale
for household use. This may explain a sharp price increase between 1954 and
1957. Later, however, the expansion of refining capacity and the discovery of
commercial quantities of natural gas exerted a downward pressure on the price.
These favorable developments in input prices during the sixties improved
the competitiveness of the Suez plant, particularly after the ammonium sul-
phate unit was added to the basic facilities, resulting in lower capital charges
per unit of However, the major reductions in costs were related to
new techniques of production and new output mixes. Moreover, since capital
invested usually increases with capacity expansion by a factor of only 0.71,17
the large scale of production at the KIMA plant and the increased scale at the
Suez plant led to more economical levels of operations.
The beneficial effects of these changes are reflected in lower resource
costs, even though the average import price of nitrogen nutrients fell by 20
percent between 1957 and and the industry suffered from the infla-
tionary developments afflicting all manufacturing industry (see Chapter 4). At
current international prices and actual capacity utilization, resource costs fell
from 61.1 piasters in 1957 to 52.3 piasters in 1964—65 at a 10 percent rate of
return, while the official exchange rate increased from 35 piasters to 43.5
piasters. Had the industry in 1964—65 been operating at full capacity (90270 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
percent), it would almost have been competitive as an import substitute at the
official exchange rate and a 10 percent rate of return. With a freight margin of
£El.20 per ton to allow for exports, resource costs in production for export
in 1964—65 would have been 56.9 piasters at actual capacity and 52.0 piasters
at hypothetical full capacity utilization. This is somewhat above the official
exchange rate but well below the rate of 61 piasters suggested by the IMP in
1966. At this latter rate the industry would seem to be competitive in exports
to neighboring Middle Eastern and African markets, where Egypt has a freight
advantage over alternative suppliers.
In 1964—65 the nitrogenous fertilizer industry had thus almost reached
trade efficiency as an import-substitute industry at the existing official ex-
change rate and as an export industry at a "realistic" exchange rate of 61
piasters per U.S. dollar, provided only that it worked at full capacity. As men-
tioned earlier, however, the weighted average ex-factory price that year implied
a nominal rate of protection of 29 percent. The, industry was really no longer
in need of this protection. Indeed, at the "realistic" exchange rate and at full
capacity utilization, the rate of return to capital would have exceeded 20 per-
cent. It is clear, therefore, that the current capacity expansion aiming at export
markets is correct despite the somewhat lower prices that this would bring.
Also, nitrogenous fertilizers are overpriced domestically, and it is noteworthy
that even at the relatively high domestic prices, optimal requirements are be-
lieved to be much higher than actual consumption. At current prices, nitrogen
requirements of agriculture have been estimated at 737,000 tons, while total
consumption in 1966 reached only 262,000 tons.1° Thus, both external and
internal reasons would argue in favor of expanding the nitrogenous fertilizer
industry.
DETERMINANTS OF THE INDUSTRY'S COMPETITIVENESS
The transition from a heavily protected industry to an almost efficient
import substitute and—at a "realistic" exchange rate—possibly even to a
profitable export industry is the result of a number of factors. Of prime im-
portance is the shift to a higher concentration of nitrogen and the exploitation
of of scale.
Table 9—3 shows a strong increase in capital productivity. Between 1954
and 1957 it was essentially due to higher capacity utilization. In 1964—65
capacity utilization was at about the same level (80 percent) as in 1957, yet
capital productivity increased by nearly 50 percent—the consequence of the
adoption of more efficient production techniques. Physical labor productivity
rose by almost the same percentage as capital productivity. And—for the first
time among the industries reviewed so far—we find a growth in labor pro-
ductivity (both physical and in terms of value added) that exceeds wage in-
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The improvement in the industry's competitiveness was also related to the
fact that it became relatively more labor-intensive (with a greater share of
wages in total costs of production) and less capital-intensive. It should be
emphasized that this technologically sophisticated industry could draw upon
a large pool of domestic engineering skills, without which it could not have
achieved the growth rate it did or succeeded in the adaptation and learning
processes that transformed it into a viable undertaking.
Conclusions.
Both phosphate and nitrate fertilizer industries appear to have attained
productive efficiency and were on their way to becoming profitable export
ventures in 1964—65. The phosphate fertilizer industry was profitable from the
outset because it could draw on a large natural resource base and needed only
to operate at optimum capacity and to solve its transport problems. The nitrate
fertilizer industry, by contrast, went through a trial period characterized by
heavy protection and high costs of production. It finally succeeded in finding
the choice of technique, product-mix, and scale of production best suited to
its relative input costs. International cost comparisons for the two fertilizer
industries reveal that Egypt derived a comparative advantage mostly because
of the low cost of rock phosphate and electricity. Low labor costs and abun-
dant availability of engineering skills also contributed to the competitiveness
of the industry.20
The initial protection thus seems to have been justified by later develop-
ments, and here we have what looks like a case of a successful infant industry
policy. Investment allocation to the industry's ancillary services, particularly -
intransportation, distribution, and storage should have been larger, but there
is no indication that foreign exchange controls have directly hampered the in-
dustry. Finally, recent natural gas finds in Lower Egypt promise further de-
velopment in even more competitive technologies.
THE RUB?SER TIRE INDUSTRY
The development of the tire industry in Egypt originated in the early 1950s,
when private entrepreneurial interests, encouraged by the government's com-
mitment to industrialization, obtained guarantees that a domestic tire industry
would be adequately protected from foreign competition. From the outset, the
project appeared as a purely import-substituting venture without much pros-
pect for developing a comparative advantage and expanding its activities into
the export field.272 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
Demand for tires and tubes amounted to 4,000 tons in 1951 and, while
it declined because of the recession following the end of the Korean boom
(see Chapter 2), demand projections were encouraging. The size of the exist-
ing stock of motor vehicles, its rate of increase, the extension of the road net-
work, and plans pertaining to the establishment of an automobile industry
were all cited in favor of the project. In 1953 the Transport and Engineering
Company presented the Permanent Production Council with a proposal for the
construction of a 5,000-ton tire plant to be expanded to a capacity of 10,000
tons within six years.21 This is a small plant by world standards, but economies
of scale in this industry are not very important over a broad range of output.22
On the supply side, the situation appeared less favorable. Unlike other
industries considered in this chapter, the tire industry did not have any do-
mestic raw material base that might have given it a cost advantage (equal to
freight). It had to rely almost entirely on imported raw materials. A theoreti-
cal possibility of domestic substitution for some of the inputs does exist, such
as synthetic rubber and nylon cord from petroleum feedstock, and steel beads
and wires from the domestic iron and steel industry. The first is practically
excluded, however, because of the large size of the minimum efficient plant
(27,000 tons as compared with a domestic demand of 2,000 tons for synthetic
rubber in 1963—64) ,23andthe latter is still only a remote possibility. The cost
data for 1963—64 reveal that, after eight years of operation, 92 percent of the
total material inputs (including services) were still imported.
In approving the project, the Permanent Production Council subscribed to
25 percent of the original capital raised and recommended a number of pro-
tective measures:24 (a) waiving of customs duties on imported raw materials
and machinery and the imposition of adequate duties on imported tires, (b)
assuring the firm of sufficient foreign exchange for imported raw materials, and
(c) a government guarantee to purchase its tire requirements from the plant
for five years at a price equal to production costs plus a 10 percent margin,
provided the price would not exceed the price paid by the U.S. government for
its tire requirements plus freight and insurance costs.
Production andTrade.
The tariff recommendations were adopted in May 1954. Information
about their immediate impact on tire prices is not available, but tire prices
went up by 21 percent from 1955 to 1957. The factory went into operation in
1956, and production expanded smoothly (by 12.5 percent a year) over the
period from 1956 to 1970, hardly affected by raw material shortages except,
for a brief period, as an aftermath of the 1967 War (Chart 9—3).
Imports declined steadily from 1957 to 1964, while exports increased
rapidly from 1959 on and surpassed imports by 1961. The continued flow ofEFFORTS TO BROADEN THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE 273
CHART 9-3
Rubber Tires: Production and Trade, 1956—1970
imports is partly due to the limited production program of the factory. In 1965
exports fell to almost nothing while imports soared from about 650 tons in
1964 to 7,000 tons in 1966, with a production of about 10,000 tons. In 1967
imports fell back to their earlier level, and in 1968 exports began to recover.
In 1969 and 1970 the situation was quite similar to that of the years 1963 and
1964, with production, imports, and exports all running at somewhat higher
levels. In the post-1967 period, net imports were restricted by a system of
domestic rationing.25
We have no satisfactory explanation for the peculiar movements of trade
between 1965 and 1967. Inventories increased from 1964 to 1965, but that
can explain only a minor part of the apparent increase in consumption. Since
there was a simultaneous rise in imports and drop in exports, with the rise in
Thousand tons
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imports greatly exceeding the fall in exports, it would be natural to look for an
explanation in the development of domestic demand. Domestic production
problems can be ruled out as an explanation because production actually in-
creased substantially alongside the increase in tire imports. Government de-
mand is unknown, but it seems likely that an increased share of production
was absorbed by the army (possibly to satisfy replacement demand after three
years in Yemen). A rapid growth in the stock of registered private automobiles
from 1961 to 1963 may also, with a lag, have led to a burst of replacement
demand in 1965 and 1966. But erratic import licensing should not be ruled
out, either.
CostsandRevenues, 1960—61 and 1963—64.
Cost and revenue data are available for the years 1960—61 and 1963—64.
This is a short interval for studying the development of competitiveness and
physical productivity, but it conveniently straddles the 1962 devaluation and
the nationalization of the industry.
The output of this industry is rather heterogeneous. It includes both tires
and tubes, of different sizes, and, in the case of tires, different number of plies
and other characteristics. Thus, the choice of international prices to be used in
the estimates of ERPs and DRCs gave rise to problems. C.i.f. prices for mdi-
vidual tires and tubes were not available (in any case, it would not have been
feasible to work on a completely disaggregated basis). C.i.f. values per unit
had to be derived from trade statistics, but Egyptian import statistics could not
be used for this purpose because imports in 1960-61 had become complemen-
tary to domestic production and thus had a completely different composition.
Hence, trade data for Lebanon and Syria were used. Both countries have
roughly the same truck-automobile ratio as Egypt, and both import all their
tires and tubes, with approximately the same cost, insurance, and freight as
Egypt when importing from the major European and Japanese suppliers. Unit
values were almost constant for both Lebanon and Syria during these years,
with the average c.i.f. unit value equal to U.S. $1.04 per kilogram. We have
applied this c.i.f. price to Egyptian production for both 1960-6 1 and 1963—64.
In doing'this, we ignore the fact that Egypt did not produce all of its consump-
tion, but in 1960—61 imports amounted to only about 10 percent of total con-
sumption (by weight). The remaining imports consisted partly of automobile
tires for special purposes, but contained also motorcycle and bicycle tires. It is
difficult to say, therefore, whether our choice of c.i.f. unit value exaggerates or
underestimates the international value of Egyptian production. We also call the
reader's attention to the possibility of quality differences between the imports
of Lebanon and Syria and Egyptian output: most probably the Egyptian
product's quality was lower than that of European tires. In regard to f.o.b.EFFORTS TO BROADEN THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE 275
prices,we had no choice but to use the unit value of Egyptian exports. It may
be too high for our purposes because all Egyptian. exports were made under
bilateral agreements, and these may tend to inflate prices.
Competitiveness of the Industry, 1960-61 and 1963—64.
Table 9—4 summarizes the main results of our estimates. We note first
that the profitability of the industry at actual domestic prices and costs was
extraordinarily high. In 1960—61, the rate of net profit (before payment of
TABLE 9-4







(at c.i.f.and effectivec.i.f. f.o.b.
prices) rates) prices)prices)
Rate of return (%)
at actual domestic prices 71.5 69.9 59.8a
at interriati. prices .
actual effective rates 8.1 6.3 2.5a ,
official rates —0.1 .
ERP (%)
at actual effective rates 239.9 235.9 261.9a
at official rates 427.4
DRC (piasters per U.S. $)
at 5% rate of return 48.2 37.7 48.5 51.7
at 10% rate of return 58.5 46.5 58.5 62.2
at 15% rate of return 68.9 55.4 68.4 72.8
• 1960—61 1963—64





SouRcE: B. Hansen and K. Nashashibi, NBER Working Paper
1975, Table 26.
a. At official rate.
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interests, rents, and taxes) on capital invested was 71.5 percent. In 1963—64,
after the devaluation, nationalization, and wage increases, profitability was
lower but remained as high as 59.8 percent (an attempt to calculate returns on
capital at replacement costs might lower this figure to about 50 percent). The
industry was given a virtual monopoly, and government price fixing did not
prevent the emergence of huge monopoly profits.
The decline in the net rate of return during the period under review was
partly the result of the shift from multiple to uniform exchange rates that
accompanied the 1962 devaluation. In 1960—6 1 a multiple rate system had
been in effect, with an exchange premium of 20 percent applied to imports of
tires and tubes. For imported raw materials the premium was only 10 percent
and for imported machinery and spare parts it was usually waived. The multi-
pie rate system thus implied a subsidy to the industry. It disappeared with the
devaluation, which,on balance, was unfavorable to the industry.
The implicit nominal tariff protection for tires (expressed by the differ-
ence between domestic output price and c.i.f. price at actually applied exchange
rates) was 67 percent in both years under study. The ERP in 1960—61, how-
ever, was 239.9 percent at actual exchange rates (including premium) and
427.4 percent at the official exchange rate. These high ERPs are, of course,
related to the high import content of production and the low tariffs on
imported inputs.
At international prices, the monopolistic profit would, of course, disap-
peari but it is interesting that there would still be a profit left in 1960—61, close
to "normal" (8.1 percent), at least at the actual multiple exchange rates. At
the official rate and international prices, however, the rate of return would
be about zero. The difference indicates the subsidy that the multiple exchange
rate system implies for this industry.
The DRC in 1960—61, at 10 percent return to capital, was 58.5 piasters
per U.S. dollar and was thus much higher than the official rate of 35.2, as
well as considerably higher than the exchange rates actually applied to the
industry—41.9 for outputs and 38.7 for inputs. The apparent contradiction—
that the industry would be almost "normally" profitable with a rate of return
of 8.1 percent at international prices and actual exchange rates but that, none-
theless, the resource costs at 10 percent return would be much higher than
the level of the actual rates—is related to the fact that the actual exchange
rate for output was higher than for inputs (see above).
In 1963—64 the official exchange rate applied to the industry was 43.5.
The ERP was now 261.9 percent, somewhat higher than at the actual rates
in 1960—61, but much lower than at the official rate that year. The DRC at
10 percent return to capital remained unchanged from 1960—61 at 58.5. Thus,
the industry continued to be noncompetitive, but the situation was clearly much
better than in 1960—61, and the industry would have been competitive at the
rate of 61 suggested by the IMF in 1966. For 1963—64 we have also calcu-EFFORTS TO BROADEN THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE 277
lated the DRC on the basis of f.o.b. prices for output. At 10 percent return
on capital, the DRC in export was 62.2, quite close to being competitive at the
rate of 61 just mentioned.
Since wage costs increased very considerably during the three-year period,
the unchanged DRC indicates that productive efficiency must have improved
substantially. To illuminate this aspect of the problem, we have calculated
the DRC for 1963—64 at constant 1960—61 prices and effective exchange
rates. At 10 percent return to capital, the DRC thus calculated was 46.5, corn-
pared with 58.5for1960—61. Productivity of primary factors thus increased
by about 20 percent over three years. This increase in productivity was partly
due to a shift from natural rubber to cheaper synthetic rubber as the basic raw
matenal. The major strength of the industry as revealed by a comparison of
its costs with those of other countries lies in its low labor costs. This, corn-
bined with a relatively labor-intensive technology, allowed the industry to off-
set to a large extent the high cost of its imported raw materials. Despite
nationalization, the industry thus fared quite weff during these years, and to
some extent began to prove itself a successful infant industry.
THE PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY
This industry started in the early 1930s as a direct, private response to the
protective policy instituted by the tariff reform of 1930. The industry was
operating on a very small scale, almost on a handicraft basis: in 1951, seven
private firms were producing a total of about 20,000 tons of paper and card-
board, and their aggregate investment did not exceed £El.5 million.26 Their
operations were limited to the most labor-intensive stages of production, such
as cutting the raw material (mostly paper waste) and reducing it to pulp.
More elaborate and technically demanding processes, such as bleaching and
glazing, were not attempted. Consequently, only crude packing paper and
crude varieties of cardboard were produced, while imports satisfied the demand
for finer qualities, particularly printing and writing paper. Both production
and imports increased rapidly during the 1950s as consumption expanded. The
demand for finer quality paper, used for direct consumption and as an input
in the printing industry, and for kraft packing paper, particularly by the cement
and fertilizer industries, became sufficiently large to encourage the establish-
ment of modern integrated paper mills (Chart 9—4).
Technical Characteristicsof theModern Establishments.
As was the case with tires and steel (see below), the Production Council
also played a crucial role in the development of the modern paper industry.
In 1953 the Council made a survey of agricultural waste in Egypt to ascertain278 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS 114 INDUSTRY
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CHART 9-4
Paper: Production and Imports, 1950—1970
its possible use as the raw material basis for various varieties of paper pulp
and sent missions abroad to solicit tenders for integrated paper plants in
A pulp and paper mill was established in 1958 at Alexandria
(RAKTA) with a capacity of 24,000 tons,28 and in 1960 a kraft paper mill
was established at Suez with a capacity of 20,000 tons. Production in the
two mills began in 1961 and 1963, respectively.
These plants were located near sources of bulky raw material. The pro-
duction of writing and printing paper in the Alexandria plant was based on
rice straw from the northern part of the Delta. The kraft paper mill was divided
into two units: one, producing pulp from bagasse, was located near the sugar
factory at Edfu, while the other, the paper plant, was located at Suez next
door to the fertilizer factories that were to receive a large part of its output.
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The plants were quite satisfactory as regards linkage effects: they pro-
vided a market for the growing chemicals industry (using caustic soda and
chlorine as inputs) and for by-products from sugar and rice production with
a very low opportunity cost. By 1970 the importation of inputs was limited
to some wood pulp and spare parts, whose share of total input value did not
exceed 30 percent. On the other hand, the capital intensity of these plants ex-
ceeded that of any other manufacturing industry in Egypt.
Despite large investment outlays—SE 17.1 million—the scale of opera-
tions seems to have been uneconomical. Paper production of acceptable quality
is subject to large economies of scale with respect to fixed capital. For in-
stance, a 500-ton-per-day paper mill would have required U.S. $120,000 in
equipment per ton of daily output, while a 250-ton-per-day plant would re-
quire U.S. $180,000.20 Doubling of plant size would thus reduce capital costs
per unit of output by about one-third. The printing paper plant at Alexandria
was designed to produce only 66 tons of paper per At full capacity, its
capital per ton of output at the official exchange rate amounted to U.S.
$740,260, with capital charges alone amounting to 24 percent of output value
(at full employment and 10 percent interest). The kraft paper plant required
similar capital investments. To be sure, additional lines of production can
always be added in tandem with existing facilities as the market expands. This
was done at the Alexandria plant in 1965, when a cardboard unit was added,
and in 1968, when the printing paper capacity was expanded. But it is mainly
administrative labor that is saved by this piecemeal approach. Capital re-
quirements are by and large the same, and generally there is no large-scale
advantage in regard to variable costs.
The planned small scale of production was not based on any accurate
forecast of demand. Within a few years, as we sha1l see, excess demand was
reflected in a general shortage of paper and rising imports.
Import Substitution.
Table 9—S shows production, imports, and prices (domestic and inter-
national) of paper over nearly two decades (1953—1970). During this period
domestic production increased at an annual average of 12 percent, reducing
the share of imports in total consumption, which increased at an annual
average of 4.7 percent (that is, roughly in line with GNP).
Reports from industries depending upon the output of the paper industry
make it abundantly clear, however, that supply did not always meet demand,
so that at times paper shortages emerged. Such shortages appeared for the
ñrst time in the aftermath of the 1956 Suez War, when imports were dis-
rupted.30 Together with the higher level of protection that the government
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controls, as explained in Chapter 2, the shortages contributed to a rise
in prices which, in turn, induced an expansion of production. The average re-
turn on invested capital in the industry jumped from 7 percent in 1954 to
22.6 percent in and one of the enterprises embarked upon production
of printing and writing paper, albeit on a small scale (6,000 tons at full capa-
city). Imports were subsequently increased and demand satisfied. But the price
rises that had taken place caused concern on the part of both the government
and the printing industry (the latter being much more important than the
small paper industry). In 1960, therefore, the government stepped in;it
ordered price reductions by 15 percent on average for domestic paper and
limited profit margins for imported paper.32 The price cuts resulted in stag-
nation of domestic production, and the authorities had to permit a sharp in-
crease in imports. Domestic costs of production—suffering from both a primi-
tive technology and rising prices for produced inputs, domestic as well as
imported—were rapidly moving out of line with the falling world market prices,
and increased protection was required if private industry was to maintain,
let alone increase, its share of domestic consumption.
The situation changed with the nationalizations of 1961, on the one hand,
and production starting, on the other, in the Alexandria and Suez plants in
1961 and 1963, respectively. Production expanded and profitability no
longer a condition for increased domestic output. After four years of stagna-
tion, production in 1962 was back on the growth path followed from 1950 to
1958. Imports were cut back somewhat but total supply had increased, and in
the aggregate, equilibrium between demand and supply was probably estab-
lished for the moment, although shortages could still occur for particular
types of paper.
The 1962 devaluation did not lead to changes in the quoted prices for
many varieties of paper, domestic as well as imported. This may be under-
standable in some cases where the import premiums, replaced by the devalua-
tion, had exceeded the devaluation. Input prices, on the other hand, rose by
about 10 percent as a result of the devaluation, and the general effect on profits
was adverse:33 in this regard the paper industry shared the general fate of
manufacturing industry during these years (see Chapter 4). For the new pro-
duction of printing and writing paper from the RAKTA mill, prices were
brought into line with the prevailing domestic prices for imported paper, or
some 50 percent above the c.i.f. prices, a level at which they remained until
1968. Considering the price cuts in 1960 and the price policies at the time of
the 1962 devaluation, the overall degree of protection of domestic production
may not have increased from 19M to 1969 despite rising domestic production
costs. Domestic wholesale prices for paper increased by 20 percent from 1954
to 1969, while world prices went up about 6 percent (Table 9—4) and the
official devaluation in 1962 amounted to 24 percent.282 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
In 1965 the RAKTA mill reached full capacity of production, but, with
imports of paper varieties similar to those produced at RAKTA prohibited,
shortages had again become serious and a black market emerged. The shortage
of paper in the market was estimated to be about 37,000 tons that year, or some
20 percent of actual supply, and was attributed to the low foreign exchange
quota allocated to the industry by the trade authorities.34 In addition, repeated
complaints were voiced that the distribution of imports by paper variety did
not correspond to actual demand, and that domestic varieties more often than
not failed to meet minimum specifications in regard to quality.35 A sharp in-
crease in imports in 1965 and 1966 alleviated these shortages, but supply was
disrupted again by the 1967 War. In that year a new line of cardboard produc-
tion with a capacity of 15,000 tons was opened at the RAKTA mill. This ex-
pansion was offset, however, by the partial destruction of the Suez kraft paper
plant by Israeli attacks.3° New paper shortages appeared in the immediate after-
math of the war as imports were disrupted. In the following year imports
remained inadequate and black markets in certain types of paper prevailed,
although prices were increased and productive capacity was further expanded
in 1969 by the addition of a new printing paper line in the RAKTA mill.37
While paper imports were reduced to only one-third of domestic Consump-
tion, their absolute level remained virtually the same from 1950 to 1970; and
although their product-mix changed toward finer qualities, import substitution
was incomplete, particularly in the case of newsprint, which could not have
been produced solely on the basis of bagasse pulp. To judge from the increase
in demand, the Alexandria RAKTA plant could have been designed for a much
larger capacity of production, possibly twice the actual capacity. However,
there may have been some rational arguments for keeping the new industry
at a low scale of production despite high fixed costs: lack of skilled workers,
difficulties in mobilizing sufficient domestic raw materials, and, particularly,
the necessity of gaining experience before even larger capital outlays were sunk
in the industry.
Costs and Revenues: Competitiveness.
The large diversity of paper varieties produced in Egypt and the difficulty
of obtaining the corresponding import price data precludes an analysis of the
competitiveness of the industry as a whole. Fortunately, cost of production
data were available for the operations of an important modem segment of
the industry—the integrated paper and pulp RAKTA mill, which produces
printing and writing paper only. The data cover the fiscal year 1962—63, im-
mediately following the devaluation. Note that at that time there were still
some starting-up expenses and capacity utilization was less than full; thus, we
are studying an industry in its infant stage. Prices ex-factory were fixed atEFFORTS TO BROADEN THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE 283
£E151.5 and £E142.3 per ton for writing and printing paper, respectively,
well above the corresponding c.i.f. prices of £E96.0,and £E90.O per ton for
allegedly equivalent varieties at the official exchange rate.38 The price differ-
ential corresponds to a de facto nominal protection of 58 percent, but does
not take into account the possibility that the quality of domestic paper may
have been inferior to that of imported paper.
Costs of production at domestic and international prices are shown
elsewhere.3° As in the case of iron and steel (see below), at international
prices, costs of traded inputs are close to the value of output, while total
input costs (both traded and nontraded) even exceed output value. Thus,
at international prices we have negative value added, defined in terms of re-
turn to primary factors of production. However, capacity utilization was only
78 percent, which, for a highly capital-intensive industry, is important. Since
full capacity utilization was actually reached a few years later, we have com-
puted DRCs for 1962—63 both at actual and at hypothetical full capacity
utilization. The results are shown in Table 9—6 (see p. 284).
At a 10 percent rate of return, the DRC at actual capacity utilization
exceeds 200 piasters per U.S. dollar, almost five times the official exchange
rate; adjusted to full capacity utilization, it falls to 141 piasters but isstill'
more than three times the official foreign exchange rate. The DRCs evaluated
at a 5percentrate of return are very much lower because of the high capital
charges, but even at this low rate of return the industry would be far from
competitive. Cost comparisons with Indian, Mexican, and European plants
show an extremely low labor productivity in Egypt for this industry, and even
though wage costs hardly exceed 15 percent of total costs in this industry,
unskilled labor may have increased overall costs through wastage of raw
materials and an output that failed to meet the required specifications.4°
The development of world prices since 1962—63 may have helped to in-
crease the competitiveness of the industry. Stable until 1969, they rose some
20 percent in 1970 and 1971, and another 14 percent in 1973.41 On the do-
mestic front, costs of production were relatively stable during the period from
1962 to 1967, but seem to have moved up from 1967 to 1971. Domestic prices
were raised irom £E146 per ton for printing paper in 1967 to £E164 in
1970.42 Since the subsequent international price trends resulted in a substan-
tial increase in the import price of paper relative to the rise in domestic costs,
it is likely that resource costs were favorably affected.
THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY
As one of the big battlefronts of World War II, Egypt became a burial ground
for large quantities of military equipment, iron reinforcements, and shell frag-284 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
TABLE 9-6
Paper Industry: Rates of Return, ERPs, and DRCs, 1962—63
(percent)
Rate of return
at domestic prices 4.9
at international prices, c•.i.f. —3.8
ERP 239.6
(plasters per U.S. dollar)
DRC, 5% rate of return
at actual capacity utilization 148.4
at full capacity utilization . 101.9
DRC, 10% rate of return
at actual capacity utilization. 207.7
at full capacity utilization 140.7
DRC, 15% rate of return
at actual capacity utilization 266.9
at full capacity utilization 179.5
Official exchange rate 43.5
NOTE: DRC at full capacity utilization evaluated on the assumption that no incre'ase
in labor employed would take place. Other produced inputs and services were extra-
polated on a pro rata basis.
SOURCE: Hansen and Nashashibi, NBER Working Paper No. 48, 1975, Table 27.
ments. These added to the domestic supply of iron scrap which had been
exported before the war at a rate of 4,000 tons a year. The increased supply
prompted domestic entrepreneurs to push for the prohibition of scrap metal
exports. and the establishment of a domestic iron and steel industry. At that
time the -annual domestic steel consumption was only about 180,000 tons,
mostly beams for reinforced concrete, but consumption was expected to rise
rapidly with industrialization.43
With domestic scrap as their source of raw material, three steel plants
were established by competing firms in They were small, and
had electrical furnaces or open-hearth furnaces fired by fuel oil; the rolling
mills had an annual capacity of production of 30,000 tons each. These plants
seem to have been well-managed, and they benefited from low wage rates
and a price of steel scrap in line with the United Kingdom f.o.b. price. ExcessEFFORTS TO BROADEN THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE 285
demand for steel in Europe during the first postwar years contributed to the
enhancement of local competitiveness by inflating international steel prices.
Moreover, the major technological innovations that later resulted in large
spurts in productivity and output in Europe and Japan had not yet been
generally adopted. Egyptian domestic prices were about the same as average
import unit values from 1952 to 1954 (Table 9—7), and could have been
even lower had the government abolished the tariffs on imported inputs (coke,
ferromanganese, and ferrosilicon)
Thethree steel mills were using up more scrap than the economy was
currently generating, and the stock of scrap, estimated in 1953 at 200,000
tons, was being rapidly depleted. Thus, as early as 1951 the Industrial Cham-
ber for the Iron and Steel Industry exerted pressure upon the government to
provide the necessary protection and guarantees for the creation of a fully
integrated, domestic steel plant on the basis of iron ore deposits discovered at
Aswan.4° The iron content of the ore was mediocre (29 to 44 percent) and
the deposits would be depleted in thirty years, but they had the advantage of
being close to river and rail transportation. The much larger and richer
deposits (60 percent iron) known to exist in the Western Desert at the
Bahariya Oasis were left out of consideration, for they were located more
than 200 kilometers from the Nile Valley and thus required large investments
in transport.47
In 1954 the Permanent Production Council approved the project of an
integrated steel plant at Helwan (aCairosuburb) as presented by a con-
sortium of major Egyptian firms (the Misr Group) and the German firm
Demag. The Egyptian Iron and Steel Co. was established with the government
and its various agencies as a major contributor to the initial capital issued and
the Misr Group as a minority participant. Demag limited its participation to
20 percent of the value of the machinery and equipment it supplied up to a
limit of £E2 million. Subsequent increments of capital were offered to the
public with a minimum return of 4 percent guaranteed by the government.48
The plant was to have an annual capacity of 300,000 tons of crude steel,
produced by Thomas and electrical converters. Demag undertook to deliver
and install the equipment and to operate the plant in association with Egyptian
managers appointed by the shareholders.4° Top management was composed
mostly of engineers. Price estimates for various steel products, submitted by
the company to the Production Council, were between 12 and 36 percent
below import prices, conveying the impression to the government that the
plant would be competitive and would have an export potential.5° It appears
that the Helwan Steel Plant was promoted by the small rolling mills, which
saw their scrap supplies dwindling and did not want to depend on imported
raw materials. An integrated iron and steel plant would guarantee them a
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By the time the plant went into operation in the middle of 1958, £E19
million had been invested in ore extraction and production of steel. It was the
single largest investment in the 1950s, but it was not large enough: there
were substantial diseconomies of scale at that level of production and its
capacity fell far short of actual and projected demand by the time it went into
full operation. Whether the investment should have been made at all is another
question, which we shall attempt to answer in the following section.
Steel Production, Trade, and Prices, 1951-1970.
Chart 9—5 shows production of steel and imports of finished products, as
well as apparent steel consumption, from 1952 to 1970. Exports are not
shown; they remained below 10,000 tons.5' Apparent consumption equals the
sum of domestic production and imports; stock figures are not available. In
addition, we have constructed domestic and import price series for merchant
bars, produced mainly by the three small plants, and for heavy plates, produced
by the Helwan plant (Table 9—7). Two import price series are shown: unit
values (from Egyptian foreign trade statistics) and export prices obtained at
Antwerp by European countries (as quoted by the European Steel and Coal
Community) to which we have added a c.i.f. margin.52 European export
prices are given as a four-year moving average to smooth the sharp short-run
fluctuations characteristic of steel products.
Up to 1956, the actual Egyptian c.i.f. unit value for merchant bars coin-
cides roughly with the hypothetical c.i.f. series derived from the Antwerp f.o.b.
export prices. For the period 1965—1970, the hypothetical c.i.f. prices are
somewhat lower than the actual unit values (columns 3 and 2); the composi-
tion of imports became complementary to domestic production, and hence
the import-mix became more expensive than the domestic output-mix. This
was particularly evident for plates and sheets, where price differences accord-
ing to quality and size are much broader than for merchant bars. Finally, we
derived a series showing de facto protection defined as the difference between
domestic and average import prices as a percentage of average import prices.
recession from 1952 to 1954 was marked by a stagnation in the
domestic demand for steel; investment in residential building fell, and industry
was saddled with excess capacity. At that time merchant bars, used mainly in
residential construction, accounted for 80 percent of total steel consumption.
The increasing domestic production of merchant bars by the three small mills
was rapidly replacing imports. Domestic prices were almost competitive with
c.i.f. import prices, and the actual degree of protection did not exceed 5
percent. In spite of their uneconomical scale of operations, the small steel
plants were able to compete with imports, while the integrated steel plant in
Heiwan eventually proved to be highly inefficient. While this was partly dueEFFORTS TO BROADEN THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE 289
CHART 9-5
Ironand Steel Products: Production, Consumption, and Imports,
1950—1971
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to more efficient management of the small plants, perhaps a more important
reason is that the Heiwan steel plant suffered much more from its relatively
small scale of operation than did the smaller plants. Economies of scale are
largest for blast furnaces producing the basic pig iron. The small plants dis-
pensed with this stage of production altogether by using steel scrap and ingot.
Between 1954 and 1956 both production and imports rose in response
to a recovery in economic activity (Chapter 1, Table 1—10). Imports of steel
rose faster than production inputs, and the steel mills may have been close to
full capacity utilization. This caused domestic prices to rise above c.i.f. prices,
which remained steady; European f.o.b. prices were even declining slightly.
The 1956 Suez War disrupted steel importation and slowed down eco-
nomic activity temporarily. It also marked the beginning of a period of invest-
ment growth that lasted until the mid-sixties. Demand from both residential
and industrial construction rose sharply until 1962 and then more modestly
until 1966, after which it turned down slightly. The production upturn in 1958
reflects the start of the Helwan plant's operation. Imports increased slightly
until 1960. By that time, the Helwan plant was in full operation and the
expansion in output decelerated. Domestic demand, meanwhile, propelled by
the investments of the first Five-Year Plan and by the construction of the
Aswan High Dam, caused a rapid rise in imports, which equaled domestic
production in 1962. To be sure, growth in consumption slowed down some-
what with the demand curbs of 1965—66 and the aftermath of the 1967 War,
but it resumed its tempo again in the early 1970s. At that time it became
evident that the capacity of the new steelworks was far below demand. While
import substitution in steel was only partial and failed to save much foreign
exchange, it served to raise the prices of finished steel products substantially.
The degree of nominal protection of merchant bars rose from an average
of 19 percent prior to the Suez War to 36 percent for the 1958—1961 period.
This was a protective measure in favor of the three small producers, who were
facing rising scrap prices. World export prices of steel, on the other hand, had
been moving downward ever since the end of the Korean boom. Thus, domes-
tic and world prices were now moving in opposite directions.
During the 1960s, the gap between domestic prices and import prices in-
creased further, with the nominal level of protection reaching 50 percent for
merchant bars and more than 100 percent for plates. Costs of imported mate-
rials rose after the 1962 devaluation, and prices were adjusted upwards. In
1970, unit values for imported steel increased sharply, and the Egyptian gov-
ernment raised domestic prices on merchant bars and other products by 25
percent; it increased the degree of protection when world prices eased off
again in 1971. The protective position in that year vis-à-vis the hypothetical
average import prices was 70 percent on merchant bars and 93 percent on
plates. With respect to actual unit values, assuming the same quality and
specifications for imported as for domestic products, the protection wouldEFFORTS TO BROADEN THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE 291
have been 40 percent and 63 percent, respectively, for bars and plates. Signifi-
cantly, the degree of protection was much smaller for merchant bars produced
mainly by the small steel mills than for heavy plates produced exclusively by
the Helwan plant. With respect to light sections (merchant and reinforced
concrete bars), the Helwan plant had to follow the prices of the smaller
plants. Protection for products not produced by the three steel mills was
tailored to the high costs of the Heiwan plant—hence a somewhat distorted
structure of domestic prices.
The import substitution program for the steel industry brought Egypt
into the company of various other small and medium-sized developing coun-
tries that attempted to create a national steel industry and ended up with high
levels of protection (Peru, 106 percent; Columbia, 74 percent; Chile, 68 per-
cent; Mexico, 46 percent; and Venezuela, 37 percent).53 However, the result
might have been more favorable had the Helwan Steel Plant been differently
conceived, as we shall show in the following section.
Finally, as a supplier of inputs to other industries, including crude iron to
the small steel mills, the Heiwan plant must have been a source of severe
disruption. Users of steel products (finished and semifinished) had difficulties
in obtaining import licenses for them because foreign exchange authorities
anticipated a greater domestic steel output. But the Heiwan plant constantly
failed to achieve its output targets, with production even falling in 1964—65
and in 1965—66.
Costs andRevenuesof the Heiwan Plant: Competitiveness.
Cost and revenue data obtained for the steel industry refer exclusively to
the steelworks at Heiwan for the year 1964—65. Unfortunately, no inforrna-
tion is available for the three small, apparently much more efficient mills.
Nonetheless, we have here the records of the "modern" and integrated sector
of the industry that accounts for two-thirds of Egypt's output of steel products.
1964—65 was the sixth year of plant operations; it shows costs and productivity
at a time wheii initial difficulties should have been overcome. Complete data
are lacking for any earlier year, but data are available on output-mix and mate-
rial inputs for 1959—60, so that a comparison of input coefficients would be
possible. A record of profits and losses for the firm is available for the whole
period.
Our ER-P and DRC estimates, with some productivity indicators, are
presented in Table 9—8. The Heiwan plant was operating at two-thirds capacity
in 1964—65. The data were not adjusted to full capacity utilization because
the shortfall in production did not result from lack of demand but from diffi-
culties in operating the plant, preventing the planned production and output-
mix from being achieved.54292 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
TABLE 9-8
Value Added, Profits, DRC, and ERP
atthe Helwan Steel Plant, 1964—65
(000 LE)
Net domestic value added
(mc!. nontraded inputs)
at domestic prices 5,103.8
at international prices 851.5
Net value added
at domestic prices 2,459.0
at international prices —2,091.0
Wages and salaries (md. fringe benefits) 2,757.0
Net profits
at domestic prices —298.0
at international prices —4,848.3
Total capital
(historical costs) 40,000.0
(piasters per U.S. dollar)
DRC
5% rate of return 378.0
10% rate of return 480.0
15% rate of return 582.0
Official exchange rate 43.5
(percent)
ERP 599.4
SouRcE: Hansen and Nashashibi, NBER Working Paper No. 48, New York, 1975,
Table 28.
Table 9—8 reveals the industry subject to losses not only in terms of
international prices but also in terms of domestic prices, even though the
domestic, weighted average ex-factory price of its output-mix exceeded inter-
national prices by 66 percent. It is also striking that domestic value added,
defined as the value of output minus the value of traded inputs, waspositive
at international prices (albeit with an ERPofalmost 600 percent), but nega-EFFORTS TO BROADEN THE tNDUSTRLAL STRUCTURE 293
tive in terms of the conventional definition of value added (value of output
minus value of all material inputs and services). The high costs of nontraded
inputs (ore) are also reflected in the DRCs, which were about ten times the
official exchange rate (at 10 percent rate of return).
From Table 9—9 it is evident, moreover, that productivity in the Hetwan
plant was very low compared with steel plants in other countries, be they
underdeveloped or highly developed, and that productivity deteriorated with
the passage of time, culminating in a particularly poor performance in
1964—65.
The first two years of operations were marked by losses (£El.7 mil-
lion), followed by a short-lived period of recovery. In 1961—1962 the firm
even managed to break even. The devaluation of July 1962, however, raised
the prices of coke, imported ore, ferrosilicone, and spare parts—without im-
mediate domestic output-price compensation. Furthermore, there was a sharp
increase in the coke coefficient (see Table 9—9). The result was a series of
losses and worsening of productivity indices. Production reached a peak in
1963—64, with 144,032 tons of steel products, and fell thereafter to 137,970
tons in 1964—65 and 121,270 tons in 1965—66, as input coefficients rose
abnormally, labor productivity declined, and a succession of breakdowns
occurred. By 1964—65, investment in the industry(fixed and circulating
capital) amounted to £E40 million, to which another LE1O million could
be added in sEart-up expenses and accumulated losses over the 1959—1965
period. Between 1963 and 1965 the plant was absorbing more resources than
it was generating; there were hardly any savings in foreign exchange, with net
domestic value added at international prices at only £ E85 1,000 in 1964—65,
and if an international price had been attached to nontraded goods, there
would have been rather large foreign exchange losses.
Causes of the Helwan Plant's Inefficiency.
One of the major reasons usually offered for the deteriorating per-
formance is the declining quality of the iron ore. The Aswan ore deposits,
estimated to be only about 25 million tons, are shallow, have a high silicone
content, and are spread over a large area with a low iron content ranging
between 29 and 44 percent. The richer ores were depleted first and a gradual
lowering of the iron content occurred, necessitating higher coke inputs. The
rate of coke consumption in1959 was almost normal by international
standards; it rose to more than 1,200 kg by 1963—64 and within one more year
to 1,600 kg. No attempt was made to enrich the iron ore charge, which would
have reduced transportation costs and coke inputs considerably while increas-
ing the productivity of the blast furnace. Moreover, the blast furnace charges
appeared to be quite heterogeneous, and eventually a sintering plant was in—294 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
stalled to remedy the situation. Nevertheless, the performance did not improve
significantly.
The low and changing quality of the iron ore is at most only a partial
explanation. First, ore consumption per ton of steel did not increase much.
Moreover, European plants have been using ores with iron contents not
exceeding 40 percent for decades, yet they have not reached such high levels
of coke consumption. Table 9—9 shows that inputs of both iron ore and coke
were much lower in Western European countries than in Egypt.
A more general explanation might be the inexperience of Egyptian man-
agement and labor in the operation of an integrated steel plant demanding a
high degree of coordination and skill. Unlike industries (such as cement or
fertilizers) that have constant output specifications and produce in a continu-
ous flow (hence with a minimum of coordinating operations), steel shapes
have to be individually handled by labor, which ultimately bears a large share
of the responsibility for its quality. Moreover, tight coordination between
departments (blast furnace, converter, rolling mill) is essential for maintain-
ing efficiency and depends largely on the ability of labor and the engineering
staff to maintain consistent and uniform rates of production in each department.
In the light of these requirements, the labor skill structure in the plant
was totally inadequate. A consulting firm, hired to diagnose the factory's ills
ascribed much of the difficulties to the structure of the labor force.55 It found
that 35 percent of the workers were recruited from neighboring villages, had
never before worked in a factory, and continued to pursue their rural occupa-
tions. A substantial 78 percent of the workers had no technical training in
metal industries. Moreover, although substantial overstaffing was reported in
1963, employment continued to increase until February, 1965, yet output was
falling—hence, the low labor productivity (see Table 9—9) and the high labor
costs as compared with the United Kingdom and other Western European
countries.
Low labor skills and faulty installation of some production units resulted
in numerous breakdowns and work stoppages. The premature wearing-out of
the linings in one of the blast furnaces and in the Thomas converters as well
as numerous electrical power failures affecting the electrical converters may
serve as examples.56 Continual repairs explain the large expenses for spare
parts, which amounted to £E4.5 million in 1963—1965, or 16 percent of
production costs.
In addition to the poor quality of the raw material and inexperience of
the labor force, serious criticism may be directed against the whole conception
of the project. For one thing, the location of the ore deposits and that of the
plant virtually nullified Egypt's initial advantage in having domestic ore
deposits. Given the location of the deposits 900 kilometers south of Cairo,
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the ore by rail to the Cairo area was very expensive and exceeded the existent
railroad capacity. Moreover, a new bridge across the Nile had to be built at
Helwan. Shipping the ore by barge on the Nile would have meant heavy
investments in ports, barges, and tow boats, and, for deep-going barges,
navigability is not always safe. To locate the plant at Aswan would have
entailed shipping the finished product to the Delta region and coke from
Alexandria to Aswan, or from a Red Sea port. In the latter case, heavy invest-
ments in port and rail facilities would have been necessary. As a result of the
high domestic transportation costs, the Heiwan plant was paying the same
price—and often more—(per unit of iron content) for the Aswan ore as for
imported ore (c.i.f.). Hence it did not benefit from any natural advantages.
The plant also suffered from an inefficient scale of operations. It was
designed to produce 300,000 tons of steel products per year, and its two
blast furnaces (where economies of scale offer the greatest potential) had a
capacity of 400 tons per day. For that reason alone, compared with the mini-
mum efficient plant size at the various stages of production, costs per ton of
steel would be 50 percent above those of an efficient European plant.57 This
is a general problem that tends to make steel production uneconomical in
developing countries, where domestic demand is often well below the efficient
scale of operations.58
Whether Egypt could possibly have planned for a larger capacity when
the construction of the plant began back in 1956 is another question. In 1962,
when the plant had operated for two years, the country's apparent total con-
sumption was about 550,000 tons. The production of the three small plants
(already existent in 1956) was about 90,000 tons. About 250,000 tons more
were of a specification and quality that could not be produced in Egypt. Thus,
the demand at that time for products from the Helwan plant was about
200,000 tons, in contrast to planned production of 300,000 tons at full
capacity. When it reached its peak in 1966, apparent consumption was still
less than 650,000 tons, implying a demand for products from the Heiwan
plant of less than 300,000 tons. Had developments been correctly foreseen up
to 1970, there would have been no need for building a larger capacity than
tons, unless the country had planned for steel exports. It could, of
course, be argued that, with more effective demand management and foreign
exchange policies—and disregarding the 1967 War—investment and steel
consumption could have continued their growth after 1966; in that case the
capacity of the Helwan plant would certainly have been too small by 1970.
Could actual developments have been foreseen at all in 1956? To some
extent, yes. .A very substantial part of the investments undertaken during the
years 1958 to 1962, together with the Aswan High Dam project, were in fact
approved by the Production Council as early as 1954. To extrapolate a certain
growth of investment beyond 1962 would not have required too much imagi-EFFORTS TO BROADEN THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE 297
nation. However, investing for future demand means increased unutiized
capacity during the first years of operation; what is gained on the swings may
thus be lost on the roundabouts. Moreover, the risk of loss from technical
obsolescence would increase.
In fact, the Helwan plant did not benefit from various innovations intro-
duced in some European plants during the 1950s. It did not use the LD
oxygen converters, in particular, which would have resulted in a much higher
quality of steel and a lower coke coefficient, nor did it adopt the Continuous
casting process that reduces the capital-output ratio in the forge as well as
wage costs. And because of the low skill of labor, the use of automation to
ensure quality control and coordination among the various shops might have
enhanced productivity substantially despite the small scale of operations. To
be sure, itis not clear whether any of these innovations could have been
incorporated in the Egyptian steelworks in 1957—58. The most widely used
innovation in Europe at that time was the oxygen converter, but not until
1960 was it applied in developing countries; continuous casting and computer-
controlled rolling mills did not spread until the 1960s.5° The Heiwan plant was
constructed at a time of technological transition, and by 1960, when it went
into full operation, it was already obsolete. In this sense, it is a blessing that
it was planned with a relatively small capacity.
Aside from the government's heavy responsibility in the failure of the
project, one may also question the role of the German firm Demag. On the
face of it, as a participant in the investment, the firm may have miscalculated
the costs of production and subsequently incurred heavy losses. For instance,
it may have substantially overestimated the capacity of Egyptian labor and
management in running the plant. But conditions of raw material supply,
quality, and location, as well as the size and technology of the plant, should
have been sufficient grounds for turning down the project. As for the firm's
participation in the financing, it could have easily been recouped through the
deliveries of plant and equipment. Even assuming that the firm did invest up to
the maximum agreed (see above), its financial commitment amounted to only
a small part of the value of plant and equipment supplied.60 A moderate over-
pricing of its deliveries would have sufficed to recoup the capital invested—a
possibility which has suggested to some that this may be yet another instance
of questionable behavior on the part of foreign enterprises in the industrializa-
tion of developing countries.
The new steel complex currently under construction with Soviet assistance
attempts to remedy the ills that afflicted the old plant. It will incorporate both
oxygen converters and continuous casting, and will resort to the richer and
closer ore deposits of the Western Desert. Its major operations will be com-
puterized, and it will be built at an efficient scale of operations (1.5 million
tons) based on exports to the Soviet Union, partly as repayment of loans,298 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
partly in exchange for steel types that cannot be produced in Egypt. It remains
to be seen whether the new plant will prove more economical.61
THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
After World War II, Egypt could not resist setting up an automobile industry.
In doing so it followed the example of other relatively industrialized develop-
ing countries without avoiding the problems that characterize the industry in
such countries: diseconomies related to small-scale production and a high
foreign exchange Other consumer durables industries (refrigerators,
air-conditioning units, TV sets, et cetera) set up in Egypt after World War II
seem to suffer from the same problems as the automobile industry.
It is difficult to see why the automobile industry should be given a high
priority in Egypt. The relatively dense railroad system, particularly convenient
in a flat country, the large possibilities for water transportation, and the low
per capita income should tend to relegate road transportation to a secondary
level of priority. The allegedly egalitarian ideals of the régime speak strongly
against sacrificing resources for the higher income brackets' luxury goods.
Moreover, the continuous diminution in the share of exports in GNP until the
end of the 1960s would hardly warrant large expenditures in convertible cur-
rencies to set up an automobile industry and keep it going. Finally, the rudi-
mentary steel and engineering industries could not sustain a rapid process of
import substitution in automobile components or secure a dissemination of
knowledge and skills to lower stages of production. The backward linkages
simply were not there.
Imports andProductionof Automobiles.
While imports of private automobiles were licensed and restricted through
high customs duties (66 percent) during most of the 1950s, trucks and buses
were imported relatively freely, with only a 10 percent duty on chassis without
bodies,. A case can be made for the domestic assembly of trucks and• buses
because freight costs are much higher when they are assembled than
when they are imported in parts. It was on this basis that the Ford Motor
Company (the British subsidiary) set up an assembly plant for trucks in
Alexandria. It was a small enterprise with a capital of £E500,000 and 200
workers, based on importation of all parts. Output did not exceed 1,000 units
per year. The production of trucks was discontinued after the Suez War, when
the company was Egyptianized, but its predominant activity—the construction
of bodies for trucks and buses—continued, although the latter was discouraged
because the Cairo municipality insisted that bus line concessionaires import
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In 1959 a new attempt was made to develop an automobile industry
that would gradually increase its use of domestic components; in this connec-
tion agreements were reached between Egyptian firms and Deutz (Germany)
concerning production of trucks, and Fiat (Italy) and NSU (Germany), con-
cerning production of passenger cars. Deutz and Fiat were to deliver all tools
and parts. The agreement with NSU was limited to the supply of small engines
and some parts for the production of a "popular" car—the Ramses—which
represented a genuine attempt to develop an indigenous, labor-intensive tech-
nology for the production of a cheap, Jeep-like automobile with an engine
hardly exceeding the horsepower of a motorcycle.
All three firms received preferential customs treatment, which reduced
imports of other automobiles substantially. Customs duties on fully inanufac-
tured cars were raised to 70 percent, while duties on parts were lowered to
25 percent.64 Likewise, duties on assembled chassis of trucks and buses were
raised to 30 and 50 percent, respectively, while duties on components were
set at 15 The production capacity of these firms was small: 24,000
Fiat cars and 3,700 trucks and buses a year; the capacity of the Ramses plant
is not known to us, but it was a very small enterprise.
Table 9—10 shows the growth of automobile production together with
the total value of automobile imports, including all parts. Typically, the impor-
-: tationof finished cars and trucks drops when domestic assembly takes place;
if imports of parts and tools were not inchided, the real foreign exchange
outlays on motor vehicle consumption would be disguised.
From 1953 to 1955, the annual demand for new passenger cars amounted
to about 5,000 units, and for trucks and buses, to about 1,000 to 1,200 units.
After the Suez War, imports of automobiles were restricted through both
quotas and high customs duties (the former being the effective limitation),
while imports of trucks and buses were allowed to grow. These measures re-
duced foreign expenditures for private automobiles and parts and stabilized
them for all vehicles and parts at around LE 10 million (roughly 5 percent
of total imports) between 1955 and 1961.
• 1960 saw the start of production of both the Ramses and the Deutz
trucks, and in 1962 the first Fiat ("Nasr") automobiles were produced. In
1962, over 2,500 vehicles were assembled, and the total import value of
finished parts and vehicles immediately doubled to about £ E20 million. Part
of the increase can be ascribed to the devaluation, and some of it may have
been due to replenishment of stocks of materials and spare parts that were
in short supply during the 1956—1960 period. A much larger amount of for-
eign exchange, however, was clearly allocated to the importation of private
cars and parts, which can only be interpreted as a liberalization of the private
automobile policy as compared with the years from 1956 to 1960. This ten-
dency was further strengthened in 1963 and 1964, when total import expendi-
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reached the peak of its operations. Yet, capacity utilization did not exceed
one-fifth for passenger cars and one-half for trucks and buses. By then, how-
ever, the government seems to have realized the implications for foreign ex-
change expenditures of pushing the domestic car industry to full capacity.
Full capacity utilization of the three factories would have entailed foreign
exchange expenditures of at least £E60 million, amounting to one-fifth of
the total value of imports. In 1965, the foreign exchange crisis forced a cut-
back in the operation of all the plants, and in 1966 the capacity utilization
of the automobile and truck plants fell to 8 and 25percent,respectively. The
cutbacks were more severe for passenger cars than for trucks and buses: like
a number of other industries producing consumer durables with high import
contents, the automobile industry became a buffer where cuts in foreign
exchange appropriations could be made without much consequence for
other producing sectors; also, employees were not laid off despite the fall
in production.
In the absence of information about the decisions that led to the estab-
lishment of the domestic car and truck industry, one may speculate on the
causes for this total breakdown of planned performance. It does not seem
likely that the government would ever have planned to allocate £E60 mil-
lion in foreign exchange to these enterprises under the illusion of export possi-
bilities. It appears that it envisioned a rapid process of import substitution
whereby domestic components would be substituted for imported ones. Thus,
the Deutz Company submitted a time schedule according to which 27 percent
'of the truck components would be of domestic origin by the fifth year and 44
percent, by the eighth The Five-Year Plan visualized an increase in
domestic production of means of transportation from £E14.3 million to
£E41.4 million, with an increase in imports from £E14.3 million to only
£ E17.2 million.67 As it turned out, the local components used in the early
1960s included only upholstery, side windows, paint, brake lining, clutches,
batteries, and tires. Nor was there any realistic prospect that additional simple
components such as radiators and mufflers could be manufactured domestically,
simply because no plants were planned for this purpose.
In a sense, the Ramses car came closest to being a domestic product, be-
cause it partly used domestically produced metal sheets. But the crudeness of
the result, the many technical difficulties surrounding it,its unconventional
design, and the emergence of the more glamorous Fiat project (making cars
with status value) resulted in a gradual neglect of the enterprise.
The scarcity of foreign exchange in 1966 and the war of June 1967 virtu-
ally stopped production of passenger cars, while the production of trucks fell
to about one-third the peak' reached in 1963. Finally, in 1968—69 it became
clear to the government that the agreement with the Italian Fiat Company
could not be continued, considering the very large convertible currency ex-302 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
penditures involved. While alternatives were studied, cars were delivered only
to private persons who could finance the purchase through convertible cur-
rency deposited to the account of the Egyptian company in Beirut. The solution
finally reached was to resume production on the basis of Fiat components
manufactured in Poland and delivered under barter arrangements against
Egyptian exports. To relieve the domestic demand pressure, the government
liberalized imports of finished cars purchased abroad by residents who could
manage to earn convertible currencies, albeit with an increase in the customs
duty to 100 percent.
The Competitiveness of the Automobile Industry.
Revenue and cost data of the industry for 1963—64 are published else-
where.68 In calculating the effective rate of protection, we have had to take
into account the fact that ex-factory prices of finished products were far below
domestic market prices. At the official ex-factory prices, the ERP is relatively
modest—82.7 percent. However, private cars could be obtained only after
long waiting periods, through favoritism, or from the black market. In the
latter case, the prices are known to have been roughly twice the official quota-
tions; they were probably somewhat below what the cars would have fetched
at open auction. Note that black market profits accrued to purchasers who had
obtained the cars at the official prices, not to the factory. Trucks were de--
livered to nationalized transport companies and industry at factory prices,
and it is not known what their open market prices might have been. On the
rough assumption that market prices of passenger cars were twice their official
quotations, and using the official truck prices, the ERP amounts to 283 per-
cent (Table 9—1 The ERP would probably be higher if market equilib-
rium prices could be assigned to both trucks and passenger cars.
Fortunately, the domestic market price is immaterial in an evaluation
of the DRCs, which are also shown in Table 9—11. At a 10 percent rate of
return, the DRC is estimated at 113 piasters per U.S. dollar, and at the 5
percentrate of return level, at 83 piasters. Considering that the factories were
operating at only 21 and 44 percent capacity for cars and trucks, respectively,
that year, it is surprising that the production was not more inefficient. Indeed,
the DRC falls well below that found for the steel industry, and is also below
that for paper production.
Here is a possible explanation. Unlike the steel and paper industries,
where large amounts of raw materials have to be shipped, handled, and trans-
formed into final products, there are no "raw" materials in the automobile
industry. With the exception of the few domestic inputs already mentioned,
all of the produced inputs are imported components that fulfill required speci-
fications and simply have to be assembled. This circumstance virtually ex- 1
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TABLE 9—11
Automobile Industry: Rates of Return, ERPs, and DRCs, 1963—64
(percent)
Rate of return
At actual, official domestic prices 3.4
At international prices —0.9
ERP
At official prices 64.0
At black market prices for passenger cars 283.0
(piasters per U.S. dollar)
DRC
5% rate of return 82.7
10% rate of return 113.1
15% rate of return 144.3
Official exchange rate 43.5
SOURCE: Hansen and Nashashibi, NBER Working Paper No. 48, New York, 1975,
Table 29.
cludes raw materials waste (not even the metal sheets were tooled domesti-
cally) and does not allow for the breakdown of expensive equipment. To be
sure, serious inefficiency in workmanship was reported at the welding stages—
reflecting Egyptian labor's lack of experience with mechanical industries—
and slowdowns in production were also encountered due to erratic (domestic)
supplies of tires and batteries.70 But domestic resource input, including labor,
is low, and small defects in workmanship and domestic parts are not reflected
in prices or costs but are borne by the consumer. Interestingly enough, develop-
ing countries with more advanced automobile industries than Egypt (in the
sense of a higher domestic value added content) suffer from far greater in-
efficiency, mainly because their domestic supply of components often fails to
meet required specifications.71 Another reason for the relatively low degree
of inefficiency in Egypt appears to be the low prices charged by the Italian
Fiat Company for the unassembled cars. The 1,000 cc model was quoted ex-
factory in Egypt at £E700, or U.S. $1,510 at the official rate of exchange,
and while the import price of unassembled cars is not available to us, it seems
to have been around £E600.72 This seems to be a low price by international
standards, and may be explained by the "bulk" nature of the agreement and304 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
by the fact that it concerned automobile components for models that were
being discontinued in Italy.
There is no doubt that the conception and the development of the auto-
mobile industry, particularly the passenger car division, constituted a serious
misallocation of resources. It is a good example of bad "planning"; supply
linkages seem to have been completely left out of the picture, and foreign
exchange requirements were grossly underestimated. But the initial misalloca-
tion did not cumulate because the regime was unwilling to devote further re.
sources to save the industry—something which could have been done only at
the expense of other, economically sounder projects. Ironically, the very
underdeveloped state of the industry helped minimize the social losses through
the almost total reliance on foreign-made components. Given the capital in-
vestment already sunk into the project, the resource cost of current operations
does not exceed 50piastersper U.S. dollar. Thus, it is probably worthwhile
to pursue production until the existent fixed capital is worn out, as, indeed,
appears likely.73
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